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Religion and Political Economy in an International Panel* 
 







  Two important theories of religiosity are the secularization hypothesis and the religion-
market model.  According to the former theory, economic development reduces religious 
participation and beliefs.  According to the latter theory, religiosity depends on the presence of a 
state religion, regulation of the religion market, suppression of organized religion under 
Communism, and the degree of religious pluralism.  We assess the theories by using survey 
information for 61 countries over the last 20 years on church attendance and religious beliefs.  In 
accordance with the secularization view, overall economic development—represented by per 
capita GDP—tends to reduce religiosity.  Moreover, instrumental estimates suggest that this link 
reflects causation from economic development to religiosity, rather than the reverse.  The 
presence of an official state religion tends to increase religiosity, probably because of the 
subsidies that flow to organized religion.  However, in accordance with the religion-market 
model, religiosity falls with government regulation of the religion market, Communist 
suppression, and a reduction in religious pluralism.  Although religiosity declines overall with 
economic development, the nature of the interaction varies with the dimension of development.  
For example, religiosity is positively related to education and the presence of children and 
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Interactions between religion and political economy involve two directions of causation.  
On one side, a nation’s economic and political developments affect its religiosity.  In this view, 
the dependent or endogenous variables are the extent of individual religious participation and 
beliefs and the role of organized religion in a country’s political, legal, and social structure.  On 
the other side, the nature and extent of religiousness influence economic performance.  From this 
perspective, religious activities and beliefs are independent or exogenous variables. 
In a previous study (Barro and McCleary [2003]), we used cross-country data to 
investigate the effects of religious participation and beliefs on economic growth.  In this study, 
we examine the reverse effects, that is, how religiosity responds to economic development and 
other variables.  Two important theories of religiosity are the secularization hypothesis and the 
religion-market model.  According to the former theory, economic development reduces 
religious participation and beliefs.  According to the latter theory, religiosity depends on 
government intervention, including the establishment of state religion, regulation of the religion 
market, and the suppression of organized religion, such as under Communism.  Also important in 
this theory is the degree of religious pluralism, measured by the heterogeneity of religions 
represented in a country. 
We begin with a sketch of the two types of theories.  Our discussion focuses on how 
economic variables, religious doctrines, and government policies influence religious 
participation and beliefs.  Then we discuss empirical  measures of religiosity, based on 
international surveys aggregated to the country level.  Finally, we use cross-country regressions 
to analyze how religiosity reacts to economic and demographic variables; government 
institutions, including the presence of a state religion, regulation of the religion market, and 
Communist oppression; and to the composition of religions.  Our interpretations of these results   2 
combine ideas from the secularization hypothesis and the religion-market model.  As part of this 
analysis, we use instrumental variables to isolate the causation from an overall indicator of 
economic development—per capita GDP—to religion, rather than the reverse. 
 
I.  Determinants of Religiosity 
A.  Secularization and Related Hypotheses 
Many theories that seek to explain religiosity rely on the secularization hypothesis.
1  
According to this view, economic development causes individuals to become less religious, as 
measured by church attendance and certain religious beliefs.  The beliefs refer to God, an after-
life, heaven, hell, and so on, and may also refer to tendencies of people to characterize 
themselves as religious.  The secularization hypothesis also predicts that economic development 
causes organized religion to play a lesser role in political decision-making and in social and legal 
processes more generally.
2  One manifestation of this force is a tendency for official state 
churches to be abandoned as countries develop.  As the state bureaucracy matures and rule of 
law begins to function, a constitution is typically put in place, and formal religion tends to be 
separated from government.  As examples, countries such as Mexico, Turkey, Japan, and South 
Korea dropped their established state churches many years ago.  Ireland is a more recent example 
of this trend.  The secularization hypothesis remains controversial, and an important aspect of the 
present study is to assess its empirical validity in modern data.
3 
                                                 
1 The hypothesis can be viewed as a part of modernization theory, whereby economic development leads to an array 
of changes in social and political institutions.  Modernization theory, as discussed in Bell (1973) and Inglehart and 
Baker (2000), relates to the economic determinism of Karl Marx; see, for example, Marx (1913, pp. 11-12).  The 
secularization hypothesis appears in Weber (1930), but he credits the idea to John Wesley—see Wesley’s 18
th 
century essay “On the Use of Money” in Wesley (1951). For more recent discussions, see Wilson (1966), Berger 
(1967), and Martin (1978). 
2 This idea appears in Weber (1930) and has been extended in Wilson (1966), Berger (1967), and Chaves (1994). 
3 For discussions of evidence contrary to the hypothesis, see, for example, Finke and Stark (1992) and Iannaccone 
and Stark (1994).    3 
Secularization theories tend to stress particular aspects of economic development, such as 
increased education or urbanization or life expectancy or decreased fertility.  However, the 
predicted sign of the effect on religiosity tends to vary across these aspects of development.  For 
example, more education has different implications from more urbanization. 
With respect to education, one argument for secularization is that more educated people 
are more scientific and are, therefore, more inclined to reject beliefs that posit super-natural 
forces.  Put another way, if religious beliefs are based primarily on ignorance, more educated 
persons would tend to be less religious.  This viewpoint accords with Hume (1757, pp. 182-83) 
and Freud (1927), who argued that religion derived from irrational human fears and anxieties.  
They viewed religion as a mechanism for people to ward off forces that they could not rationally 
explain.  According to this view, increased education should be accompanied by reductions in 
church attendance and religious beliefs. 
A contrary argument is that religious beliefs, like many theoretical hypotheses, require 
abstract thinking or “faith.”  If highly educated persons are more capable of the speculative 
reasoning needed for intellectual inquiry, they may also be more able or willing to make the 
abstractions needed to support religious beliefs.  From this perspective, more educated persons 
might be more religious.
4 
Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) provide a different reason for why increased education 
would spur church attendance.  They argue that education increases the returns from networks 
and other forms of social capital.  Hence, they predict that more educated persons would 
participate more in various group activities, including church services.  However, in this 
approach, church attendance bears no special relation to religious beliefs—this attendance is 
modeled as just one of many ways to build social capital.  This analysis predicts no clear relation 
                                                 
4 We are grateful to Greg Mankiw for this argument.   4 
between education and religious beliefs, except in so far as more frequent church attendance 
instills greater beliefs.   
Models that focus on the role of salvation and the after-life,
5 such as Azzi and Ehrenberg 
(1975), predict that people would become more religious as they age and, hence, get closer to 
death.  Similarly, for a given age, increased life expectancy would decrease religiosity.  These 
conclusions follow if salvation depends on cumulated religious effort, including church 
attendance and prayer, during one’s lifetime.  In this case, because of discounting of future 
expenditures, it would be desirable to postpone “outlays” until later in life.   
The arguments about age and life expectancy are stronger if salvation corresponds to a 
stage toward the end of life, as in Hinduism, or if the religious doctrine provides little incentive 
to avoid wrongdoing when young, as in Catholicism.  Weber (1930) observed that the Catholic 
religion allowed for a continual cycle of sinning and absolution.
6  Therefore, people have an 
incentive to accumulate sins early in life and then repent as they get closer to death.  Weber 
argued that this pattern did not apply to Calvinist Protestantism, which dictated daily moral 
conduct throughout one’s life as the only means of finding a sign that one had been chosen.
7   
Muslim doctrine is similar to Catholic doctrine in that redemption is possible, even in 
Purgatory, by believing in Allah and ascribing to the Five Pillars of Islam.  Thus, an older 
                                                 
5 In religions outside of Judaism-Christianity-Islam, the role of an after-life is less clear.  For example, Hinduism 
does not have an after-life or heaven, per se, but does allow for reincarnation and the potential to reach eventually a 
state of perfection or enlightenment.  In terms of incentives, the potential for achieving this enlightenment can play a 
role analogous to that of an after-life.  Buddhism is, in many respects, similar to Hinduism, but without the stress on 
physical reincarnation.  For further discussion, see McCleary (2003). 
6 This cycle is consistent with the old Catholic practice of selling dispensations to sinners.  Luther’s dissatisfaction 
with the corruption of this regime was an important force behind the Protestant Reformation.  See Ekelund, Hebert, 
and Tollison (2002) for an economic analysis of the Reformation. 
7 According to Weber (1930, p. 117), “The God of Calvin demanded of his believers not single good works, but a 
life of good works combined in a unified system.  There was no place for the very human Catholic cycle of sin, 
repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin.”   5 
person—even one that has already been condemned—can always rise above past sins.  Hence, 
the Muslim religion also motivates devout behavior especially at advanced ages. 
In Buddhism, a person is continually searching for knowledge to acquire enlightenment 
and, therefore, has no incentive to defer religious investments.  Hinduism—out of which 
Buddhism originated—is less clear-cut, because lay persons are supposed to focus their pursuit 
of individual salvation in the last stage of their lives.  However, earlier stages entail religious 
obligations that contribute indirectly to a person’s ultimate enlightenment.   
Economic reasoning predicts that increases in the cost of religious activities would, 
ceteris paribus, reduce these activities.  For example, economic development raises the value of 
time, as measured by market wage rates.  Hence, development implies a rising opportunity cost 
of participating in time-intensive activities, such as church services and prayer.  On this ground, 
development tends to reduce church attendance and other religious activities.  However, this 
argument assumes that the enhanced productivity that applies generally in the economy (as 
signaled by rising wage rates) is not accompanied by similar productivity gains for time spent in 
church or at prayer.   
Aging can also affect the cost of churchgoing, especially for the sick and elderly.  On this 
ground, the prediction is that people who are ill or very old would attend church relatively little 
and, perhaps, engage in relatively more prayer at home.  These effects offset the influences 
mentioned before about a person’s response to being relatively close to death.  However, despite 
the relatively low rates of church attendance, the sick and elderly may hold strong religious 
beliefs, that is, they may invest heavily in personal “spiritual capital.” 
Children tend to attend church relatively often because their costs of attendance are 
comparatively low.  This effect is reinforced because the productivity of attendance—in the   6 
sense of the beliefs engendered through “indoctrination”—is likely to be high at young, 
formative ages.  This effect offsets the regular age influence discussed earlier.  Moreover, the 
incentive to bring children to church tends to induce greater church attendance of adults, who are 
likely to want to participate in the process of inculcating their children and in ensuring that 
religious values and traditions are transmitted across generations. 
Urbanization is another aspect of economic development that has been argued to have a 
strong negative effect on religiosity.  One reason is that church services have to compete in urban 
areas with many other forms of leisure activities, such as museums, theatres, and political 
organizations.  A possible explanation for this urban/rural pattern is that economies of scale are 
important for museums and many other social organizations but are less significant for churches.  
Since a community of believers can meet in a home, even sparsely populated rural towns can 
sustain a local congregation.  Another argument is that rural areas are dominated by agriculture, 
which is especially prone to the uncertainties of nature.  Greater church attendance in rural areas 
may then reflect a greater demand for religion as a way to cope with these uncertainties.   
  Wilson (1966) and Berger (1967) continued a theme from Weber (1930) by arguing that 
economic development leads to the secularization not only of individuals but also of political and 
social institutions, including the churches themselves.  On the political level, organized religions 
would be predicted to play a smaller role in governance and legislation.  Notably, official state 
churches would become less frequent, and separation between church and state would become 
more common.  Organized religion would be predicted to have a decreasing influence over 
regulations involving such matters as market transactions, marriage, divorce, birth control, 
abortion, and euthanasia.  Church services would be predicted to become less demanding, for 
example, by abandoning the use of a “foreign” language, requiring smaller outlays of time by   7 
participants, reducing elaborate rituals, and requiring less stringent practices by adherents.  Part 
of this process, according to Weber (1930) and Troeltsch (1931), is that religious sects—to be 
popular and attract adherents—tend to become less other-worldly and stringent. 
 
B.  Religious Competition and the Religion-Market Model 
Another argument by secularization theorists is that religiosity is fostered by the 
existence in a country of a monopoly provider of religion, for example, by the presence of an 
established state church.  If competition existed among churches, much of this competition 
would take the form of debunking the religious beliefs practiced by others.  If the beliefs were 
based primarily on superstition and ignorance, the argument is that these beliefs could not 
withstand the competition.  Hence, according to this view, the demise of official state churches—
predicted to be a part of the secularization process—would tend to foster the decline in 
individual church attendance and beliefs.  Some of this argument appears in Smith (1791, Book 
V, Article III) and is attributed partly to Hume (1757).   
However, Smith also notes that monopoly providers of religious services tend—as 
monopolies do generally—to become non-innovative and indolent.  He particularly observed this 
behavior in the Catholic Church and the Church of England.  Specifically, he argued that the 
behavior of state religions reflected the lack of strong connection between financial support and 
the provision of good service to “customers.”  Under monopoly, state religions tended to lose the 
aspects of religious devotion that were relevant to people practicing their faith.  Moreover, state 
religions tended to become a religion for elites, and—to the extent that the clergy itself became 
an elite group—of elites.  Consequently, instead of focusing on the religious needs of their 
congregants, the clergy tended to engage in secular activities, including politics, the arts, and   8 
intellectual learning.  In other words, having reached a level of affluence and a substantial degree 
of disconnection between income and service quality, the clergy were not motivated to provide a 
high level of customer satisfaction. 
Religions, such as Protestantism, whose clergy depend directly on customer contributions 
must continually address the needs of congregants to stay in business.  Hence, new religious 
movements or “upstarts,” such as the Lutherans and Calvinists during the Reformation in 
Switzerland and Germany, the Methodists and Quakers in 18
th century England, and Evangelical 
Protestants today in the United States, Latin America, and Asia, are able to enter the religion 
market by providing better service to members.  Similarly, Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison (2002) 
argue that the medieval Roman Catholic Church lost popularity because of its monopolistic 
pricing practices and because of its inability to adapt to changing socio-political conditions, 
especially the decline of feudalism.  The discontent with the Catholic Church fostered the 
popularity of Protestantism among the poor and the royalty.  In response to this type of entry, the 
established state religions sometimes resorted to coercion, repression, and violence to maintain 
their financial, political, and social arrangements.  The Inquisition in Spain in the late 1500s is an 
extreme example. 
Religion, Smith argued, is more vibrant where there is a disassociation between church 
and state, because the absence of state religion creates a climate for competition among religion 
providers (Smith [1791, Book V, Article III]).  By showing no preference for a particular 
religion, but rather permitting any religion to be freely practiced, Smith argued that the state 
would create an open market in which rational discourse among religious groups generated a 
public display of “good temper and moderation.”  In an open market, Smith predicted a continual 
subdividing of sects so that a pluralistic structure would emerge in which no religion dominated.    9 
He also contended that state support for religious monopoly would promote zealousness and the 
imposition of ideas on a public that lacks choices.  In contrast, where there is an open market for 
religion, his prediction was that one would find moderation and reason. 
Jeremy (1988, 1998) extended the Smithian view by arguing that deregulation of the 
religion market would unleash competitive forces even if the upstarts did not achieve large 
memberships.  The focus of his argument is on the legal recognition of non-conformist Protestant 
denominations during the 1700s in England (see Worsley [1816], Ashton [1924], and Hagen 
[1962]).  Part of the appeal of these groups was that they offered different visions of the link 
between salvation and economic activity.  Although these groups did not become dominant in 
religious membership, they did become important in manufacturing. 
The Smithian perspective on religious competition has been used by Stark and 
Bainbridge (1987), Finke and Stark (1992), Iannaccone (1991), and Finke and Iannaccone (1993) 
to develop a religion-market model of religious participation.  Their argument is that greater 
religious pluralism—measured, for example, by an index of the diversity of religions that exist in 
a country or region—tends to promote better service and, hence, encourages religious 
participation.
8  Moreover, an established state church—as in Scandinavia—is viewed as the 
typical source of a low degree of religious pluralism and, hence, of low participation in 
organized religion.  However, the connection between pluralism and religious beliefs would be 
expected to be weaker than that between pluralism and church attendance.  For example, Davie 
(1994) argued for post-World War II Britain that people could curtail participation in formal 
religion while still maintaining high levels of religious beliefs. 
Chaves and Cann (1992) extended the supply-side argument by using empirical measures 
of the extent of state involvement and interference with church activities.  Greater state 
                                                 
8 For a critical survey of this work, see Chaves and Gorski (2001).   10 
regulation of religion—which Chaves and Cann measured by, among other things, whether the 
government appoints or approves church leaders—was argued to decrease the efficiency of 
religion providers and, hence, to generate low rates of church attendance.  However, state 
religion also typically involves subsidies, such as payments to church employees and collections 
of taxes dedicated to church uses.  Economic reasoning suggests that these subsidies would 
encourage formal religious activity.  For example, if the government pays for additional church 
employees, buildings, and religion students, we would expect to see more such employees, 
buildings, and students.
9  More personnel and improved facilities may, in turn, attract more 
church-goers.  The point is that, through subsidies, a state religion may have a positive effect on 
religious participation.  Berman (1999) argues, however, from the Israeli experience that state 
subsidies tend to increase participation but reduce productivity. 
The opposite of subsidy is suppression, and some governments have sought to suppress 
religion, either specific ones or in general.  For example, Communist countries, such as the 
Soviet Union and China, tried hard to eradicate organized religion.  A likely reason is that 
organized religion was regarded as competitive with the Communist quasi-religion.  More 
recently, former Soviet republics in central Asia have sought to curtail Protestant and other 
“newcomer” religions (see Anderson [2002]).  These forms of oppression would be predicted to 
lower church attendance.  From an empirical perspective, it is interesting to examine not only the 
impact of Communism on church attendance and religious beliefs but also the changes that 
occurred since the elimination of Communism in many countries in the 1990s.   
Future research will be able to exploit the Religion and State (RAS) data set, described in 
Fox and Sandler (2003), to measure state subsidy and suppression of religion.  The RAS 
                                                 
9 Other forms of subsidy, such as the favorable tax treatment of the religion sector in the United States, would have a 
similar effect.   11 
tabulation describes the relation between religion and state in four categories:  separation of 
religion and state, discrimination against minority religions, restrictions on majority religions, 
and religious legislation.  These data will eventually be available for most countries back to 
1960.  However, we cannot use these data for our current study, because the tabulation is 
complete only for a subset of countries and only starting in 1990. 
 
II.  Data on Religiosity 
Our empirical research began with a previously constructed broad cross-country data set.  
The data include national-accounts variables and an array of other economic, political, and social 
indicators.  The main sources of these data are Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002), World Bank 
(2002), and Barro and Lee (2001). 
We have expanded this data set to include measures of religiosity.  The most useful 
sources of international data on church attendance and religious beliefs seem to be the surveys in 
the three waves of the World Values Survey or WVS (1981-84, mostly 1981; 1990-93, mostly 
1990; and 1995-97, mostly 1995 and 1996), the two reports on religion by the International 
Social Survey Programme or ISSP (1990-93, mostly 1991; and 1998-2000, mostly 1998), and the 
Gallup Millennium Survey (1999).  Another wave of the WVS applies to 2000-01 and will soon 
be available.  At present, we are using the survey data only to form country averages of data.  
This perspective accords with our analysis in this paper of country-wide aspects of religion, 
notably the state of economic development and the presence of official state churches and 
regulation of the religion market.  In subsequent analysis, we plan to use the individual data, 
which typically apply to 1000-2000 respondents in each survey.   12 
Putting the various sources of religion data together, and considering the availability of 
data on other variables, we are presently able to carry out statistical analysis for up to 61 
countries, which includes up to 24 countries observed around 1981, 38 around 1990, 22 around 
1991, 33 around 1995, 28 around 1998, and 43 around 1999.
10  The maximum number of 
country-time observations is 188.  The exact sample size depends on the measure of religiosity.  
The forthcoming fourth wave of the WVS for 2000-01 provides religion data for around 70 
countries for which data on other variables are also available.  Hence, this new wave will allow a 
substantial increase in the sample. 
Table 1 shows the 61 countries in the sample.  The coverage is better for rich countries 
than for poor ones and for countries that are primarily Christian.
11  The predominantly Muslim 
countries are Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey, with Nigeria also having substantial 
Muslim representation.
12  Countries that have predominantly eastern religions (including 
Buddhist), among persons expressing some religious adherence, are China, Hong Kong, Japan, 
South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
13  Malaysia also has substantial representation in 
these religions. 
                                                 
10 For the 1981 data, the information from WVS is combined with Gallup data on weekly church attendance and 
belief in God for Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania and with Gallup data on belief in life-after-death for Brazil, India, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  For the 1990 data, the information from WVS is combined with data from 
Eurodim for Greece in 1987 on church attendance and belief in God.  For the 1991 data, for some countries for 
which church attendance data were unavailable from the 1991 ISSP, we used information from the 1993 or 1994 
ISSP (which has information on church attendance but not religious beliefs).  These countries are Canada, Israel, 
Japan, Spain, Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Slovenia.  For Israel and Slovenia, the 1991 ISSP has data on 
religious beliefs but not church attendance.  The data for Israel from the 1991 and 1993 ISSP refer to the Jewish 
population only, whereas the 1998 data refer to the overall Israeli population.  Our analysis takes account of these 
differences in religious composition.  The data from WVS and ISSP give separate information for Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland.  In the present analysis, we combined these results into single observations for the United 
Kingdom, based on the relative populations of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
11 Included here are several countries that are predominantly Orthodox—Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Russia.  Estonia and Latvia also have high Orthodox representations. 
12 The 2001 wave of the WVS will allow a substantial increase in observations on Muslim countries. 
13 Some of these countries, notably South Korea, have experienced large increases in Christian adherence over the 
last 30 years.  The 2001 wave of the WVS will allow a substantial increase in observations on eastern countries.   13 
Some of the survey questions relate to attendance at religious services.  We use these 
responses to generate the fractions of the population that attended church or analogous houses of 
worship at least weekly and at least monthly.  Subsequently, we call this variable church 
attendance.  Some of the surveys (the two ISSP waves) include questions about time spent at 
prayer.  Other queries concern religious beliefs and attitudes; for example, do you believe in 
heaven, hell, life after death, and God (in various senses)?
14  Other questions, which might be 
more robust across religions, are whether the respondent considers himself or herself to be a 
religious person and whether religion plays an important role in a person’s life. 
We have used the first edition of the World Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett [1982]) to 
assemble information on religious adherence, as professed in surveys or censuses in which 
people are asked to state the religion, if any, to which they adhere.  The data apply to 1970 and 
1980.
15  These data allow us to construct measures of religious pluralism, based on Herfindahl 
indexes of adherence to the main religions.
16  Table 1 shows the values that apply in 1980 to the 
countries used in the statistical analysis (as dictated by data availability).  Countries with low 
                                                 
14 The meanings of some of these questions are clearer for some religions than others.  For example, Hinduism and 
Buddhism view heaven and hell as intermediate stages between reincarnations, whereas Christianity regards heaven 
and hell as ends, not means, to salvation.  See McCleary (2003) for further discussion. 
15 For some of the eastern European countries, which did not exist or were not covered in Barrett’s (1982) first 
edition, the data come from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) and refer to 1970 and 1990. An alternative 
procedure would be to use the country-wide averages of religion data in the various surveys.  We did not proceed 
this way because the categories of religion differ across the surveys. 
16 The pluralism measure is one minus the Herfindahl index for religions among those professing some religion.  For 
this purpose, we grouped data on religious adherence from Barrett (1982) for 1980 into nine major categories:  
Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Hindu, Buddhist, other eastern religions, Jewish, Orthodox, and other religions.  The 
Herfindahl index—the sum of the squares of the fractions belonging to each religion—can be interpreted as the 
probability that two randomly selected persons in a country, among those professing some religion, belong to the 
same religion.  Hence, one minus the Herfindahl index is the probability that they belong to different religions and 
can, therefore, be viewed as an indicator of religious pluralism.  (Implicitly, the differences between the religious 
groupings are assumed to be the same for all pairs.  Otherwise, one could weight religions in accordance with the 
extent of differences between them.)  The Herfindahl index equals one and, hence, the pluralism indicator equals 
zero if everyone belongs to the same religion.  If there are two religions of equal size, the Herfindahl and pluralism 
variables each equal one-half.  The Herfindahl index equals (almost) zero and, hence, the pluralism indicator equals 
(almost) one if there are a large number of religions each of which covers a negligible fraction of the population.  
With nine groupings, the lowest possible value of the Herfindahl index is 0.11, so that the highest possible value of 
the pluralism measure is 0.89.   14 
levels of pluralism include some that are predominantly Catholic (Spain, Italy, Portugal, 
Belgium, Ireland, and much of Latin America), Protestant Scandinavia, Orthodox Greece, and 
Muslim Pakistan and Turkey.  Places that exhibit high levels of pluralism include the United 
States, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, Nigeria, and 
South Africa. 
We used Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson’s (2001, pp. 834-35) tabulations to measure the 
presence or absence of a state religion.  These classifications are clearer in some cases than 
others.  In some of the straightforward situations, the constitution designates an official state 
church and restricts or prohibits other forms of religion.  However, even without these 
designations or prohibitions, the government may systematically favor a religion through 
subsidies and tax collections or through the teaching of religion in public schools.  These 
considerations caused Barrett, et al, to classify some countries as having a “state religion,” 
despite the absence of an official state church in the constitution.  Controversial cases in this 
category include Italy, Portugal, and Spain, which are considered by Barrett, et al, to have a 
Catholic state religion even in 2000.  Table 1 shows the classifications in 1970 for the countries 
used in the analysis.  In subsequent work, it will be possible to use Fox and Sandler’s (2003) 
Religion and State data set, which we already described, to get improved measures of state 
religion. 
We used Barrett’s (1982) and Barrett, Kurian and Johnson’s (2001) discussion of each 
country (supplemented in some cases by individual country reports) to obtain a proxy for state 
regulation of religion.  We used the concept suggested by Chaves and Cann (1992)—whether the 
government appoints or approves church leaders.  The Barrett, et al, discussions of this concept 
typically refer to the late 1970s.  However, the information is often incomplete and not fully   15 
consistent across countries.  The data used in the present analysis are in Table 1.  The Religion 
and State data set will eventually also provide improved measures of this variable. 
 
III.  Cross-Country Findings on the Determinants of Religiosity 
A.  Setup of the Analysis   
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the analysis.  
Table 3 reports the results from panel regressions in which measures of religiosity are related to a 
set of explanatory variables that includes per capita GDP as the indicator of economic 
development.
17  The other explanatory variables are the dummy variables for state religion and 
state regulation of religion, dummy variables for the presence and subsequent removal of 
Communist governments, the composition of a country’s adhering population among the major 
religions, and the measure of religious pluralism, which is constructed from the adherence data.
18  
  Table 3 contains seven systems, corresponding to different measures of religiosity.  The 
measures are the fraction of the population attending church at least weekly (column 1), fraction 
attending at least monthly (column 2), fraction who believe in heaven (column 3), fraction who 
believe in hell (column 4), fraction who believe in an after-life (column 5), fraction who believe 
in God (column 6), and fraction who consider themselves religious (column 7).
19  We refer to the 
                                                 
17 The GDP data are from version 6.1 of the Penn World Tables, as described in Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  
These values, available on the Internet, adjust for purchasing power differences across countries. 
18 Inglehart and Baker (2000) use a single cross-section from the World Values Survey to assess the relation of 
religious and other values to per capita GDP and industrial structure.  They also look at effects from different 
religions and from a history of Communist government. 
19 In the WVS and ISSP surveys, we coded an individual’s dummy for belief in heaven or hell, respectively, as one 
if the respondent answered yes to the question “Do you believe in Heaven?” or “Do you believe in Hell?”  These 
questions are not in the Gallup Millennium Survey.  We coded an individual’s dummy for belief in an after-life as 
one in WVS if the respondent answered yes to the question “Do you believe in life after death?”  For ISSP, we 
coded the dummy as one if the respondent answered yes, definitely, or yes, probably, to the question “Do you 
believe in life after death?”  The after-life question was not in the Gallup Millennium Survey.  We coded an 
individual’s belief-in-God dummy as one in WVS if the respondent answered yes to the question “Do you believe in 
God?”  For ISSP, we coded the dummy as one if the respondent selected any of the following: “I know God really 
exists and I have no doubts about it;”  “While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God;” “I find myself believing   16 
last variable as religiousness.  The form of each dependent variable is the transformation 
log[x/(1-x)] of the original series x.  This form confines the fitted value of x to the interval 
(0,1).
20 
Each system comprises five or six equations corresponding to the religiosity survey data:  
the first is for data around 1981 from the World Values Survey (WVS), the second is for data 
around 1990 from WVS, the third is for data around 1991 from the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP), the fourth is for data around 1995 from WVS, the fifth is for data around 
1998 from ISSP, and the last is for 1999 data from Gallup (available only for church attendance 
and belief in God). 
The panel estimation technique allows us to combine countries that are represented in 
different surveys, as well as to include multiple observations for a single country.  We recognize, 
however, that observations at different points in time or from different survey sources for a 
single country would not be independent.  Therefore, we use the method of seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR), which estimates, along with the coefficients, the correlations of the error terms 
in the equations for the different surveys for a given country.
21  We also allow for differences in 
                                                                                                                                                             
in God some of the time, but not at others;” and “I don’t believe in a personal God, but I do believe in a Higher 
Power of some kind.”  (Results were similar if we used a more stringent definition of belief in God from the ISSP 
surveys.)  For the Gallup Millennium Survey, we coded the dummy as one if the respondent answered yes to whether 
“there is a personal God” or whether “there is some sort of spirit or life force.”  We coded an individual’s 
religiousness dummy as one in WVS if the respondent answered yes to the question “Independently of whether you 
go to church or not, would you say you are a religious person?”  For ISSP, we coded the dummy as one if the 
respondent selected any of the following:  “Would you describe yourself as 1. extremely religious, 2. very religious, 
or 3. somewhat religious?”  The religiousness variable was not in the Gallup Millennium Survey. 
20In this form, the marginal effect of an independent variable on x equals the coefficient of the variable multiplied by 
the quantity x·(1-x).  Hence, the marginal effect of an explanatory variable on x diminishes in magnitude as x 
approaches zero or one.  For a broad range of x—say between 0.2 and 0.8—the functional form is roughly linear. 
21 For a discussion of the SUR technique, see Wooldridge (2002, ch. 7).   17 
average survey results across the sources by including a different intercept term for each 
source—WVS, ISSP, and Gallup.
22 
For the composition of the population by religion, we use an eight-way breakdown for 
1980 among Catholic, eastern religions (including Buddhist), Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox, 
Protestant, and other religions.
23  In each case, the variable refers to the fraction adhering to the 
specified religion among persons who expressed adherence to some religion.
24  The Catholic 
fraction is the left-out category.  Hence, each coefficient should be interpreted as the effect from 
the indicated religion relative to that for Catholic. 
 
B.  Relations with Economic Development 
The results in Table 3 show significantly negative relationships between economic 
development, as gauged by per capita GDP, and the measures of religiosity, except for 
religiousness.  For example, for monthly church attendance, the estimated coefficient on the log 
of per capita GDP is -0.52 (s.e. = 0.10).  This coefficient means that, when evaluated at the 
sample mean of monthly attendance, a one-standard-deviation increase in the log of per capita 
GDP (by 0.77, as shown in Table 2) reduces the attendance rate by 9 percentage points (from 
0.37 to 0.28).  For belief in heaven, the estimated coefficient is -0.80 (s.e. = 0.13).  This 
                                                 
22 Formally, we included a constant term and two dummy variables, one for the ISSP source and one for the Gallup 
source.  The Gallup dummy was included only in the systems for church attendance and belief in God, for which the 
Gallup data were available. 
23 Buddhist and other eastern religions were combined because of a lack of sufficient data from Asian countries to 
distinguish these two categories.  For the pluralism indicator, we used a nine-way breakdown that distinguished 
Buddhist from other eastern religions.  Our present data do not allow us to differentiate among theological 
subgroups, for example, types of Muslims and Protestants.   
24 The composition of religious adherence across persons who exhibit some adherence may be exogenous with 
respect to church attendance and religious beliefs.  However, it is unreasonable to regard the breakdown between 
some and no adherence (appearing in the data as non-religious or atheist) as exogenous with respect to attending 
church or holding religious beliefs.  Therefore, it would be inappropriate to include among the explanatory variables 
a measure of the fraction of the population that expressed no religious adherence.    18 
coefficient means that a one-standard-deviation increase in the log of per capita GDP reduces the 
belief rate by 15 percentage points (from the mean of 0.56 to 0.41).   
The findings for the effects of per capita GDP accord with the secularization view.  
Moreover, we argue later that we can interpret these relations as effects of economic 
development on religiosity, rather than the reverse.  However, we also find that, when we go 
beyond per capita GDP to bring in additional dimensions of economic development, the relations 
with religiosity depend a great deal on the particular dimension.  For example, as conjectured 
before, the effects from education are very different from those of urbanization. 
 
C.  Trends in Religiosity 
We can think of trends in religiosity as stemming partly from trends in the explanatory 
variables in Table 3—for example, long-term increases in per capita GDP—and partly from 
trends that apply for given values of the explanatory variables.  We consider here the second 
channel, that is, we examine whether there are secular trends in religiosity for given values of the 
explanatory variables. 
For the systems in Table 3, the same constant applies for each survey year, except that 
dummy variables were included to allow for systematic differences in the three sources: WVS, 
ISSP, and Gallup.  Within the WVS and ISSP data, the same constant terms apply to the surveys 
from different dates—WVS for 1981, 1990, and 1995, and ISSP for 1991 and 1998.  Therefore, 
we can test for trends by allowing these constant terms to vary over these dates.  This test 
considers whether, for the WVS surveys, there are systematic differences, for given explanatory 
variables, in the religiosity data for 1981, 1990, and 1995.  Similarly, the test looks for 
systematic differences in the ISSP data for religiosity in 1991 and 1998.   19 
The conclusion is that, at the 5% critical level, the only statistically significant trend is for 
increasing belief in hell.  At the 10% critical level, there is also evidence for increasing belief in 
heaven.  For both hell and heaven, the main evidence for the rising trends comes from 
comparisons of the 1995 WVS wave with the two earlier WVS waves.  For church attendance, 
the comparison between the 1991 and 1998 ISSP waves shows some decrease over time.  
However, the overall trends in church attendance are not statistically significant.  Thus, if we 
think of secularization as a downward trend in religiosity that applies for given economic and 
other variables, there is no evidence for secularization in this sense. 
 
D.  State Religion, State Regulation, and Communism     
Table 3 shows that the estimated coefficients on the state-religion dummy variable are 
significantly positive for church attendance and also for beliefs in heaven and hell.   For 
example, for monthly church attendance, the estimated coefficient of 0.75 (s.e. = 0.16) in 
column 2 implies, if viewed causally, that the imposition of a state religion would raise the 
monthly attendance rate by 18 percentage points (from the mean of 0.37 to 0.55).  This pattern 
conflicts with the one predicted in the religion-market model of Stark and Bainbridge (1987), 
Iannaccone (1991), Finke and Stark (1992), and Finke and Iannaccone (1993).  In that view, state 
religion promotes monopoly and, therefore, poor service and low rates of church attendance.  
However, since state religion typically goes along with state subsidy, we do not find it surprising 
that the overall relation between state religion and church attendance would be positive, and we 
do find this pattern in our data. 
These results apply when we use the status of state religion as of 1970.  Our sample does 
not contain enough changes in state religion after 1970 to assess the dynamic responses of   20 
church attendance and religious beliefs.  The main example of a shift since 1970 is Ireland’s 
abandoning Catholicism as its state religion in 1972, although Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson 
(2001) continue to classify Ireland as officially religious but not officially Catholic.  Legislative 
changes also occurred after 1970 in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, but Barrett, et al, continue to label 
these countries as maintaining Catholic state religions even in 2000.  More recently, Sweden 
dropped the Lutheran church as its state religion, and Bulgaria established the Eastern Orthodox 
Church.  If we compare 1970 with 1900, we find many examples of countries abandoning state 
religions.  Using Barrett, et al’s (2001) data, examples for countries in our sample are Brazil, 
Chile, China, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Russia.  Some 
countries that were not independent in 1900 (Bangladesh, Israel, and Pakistan in our sample) 
introduced state religions when they became independent.
25   
In the 1990s, some countries that were formerly parts of the USSR and Yugoslavia 
introduced features of state religions.  However, these countries lack sufficient historical data to 
be included in our sample.  Based on information from Barrett, et al (2001) and U.S. State 
Department reports, countries that introduced aspects of a Muslim state religion are Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  Those implementing aspects of an 
Orthodox state religion are Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldavia, and Ukraine.  
Croatia introduced some features of a Catholic state religion.  In a later study, we plan to assess 
the rise of state religions in the former Communist countries. 
The results for state religion in Table 3 apply when we hold constant a measure of 
religious pluralism (discussed below).  One part of the argument in the religion-market model is 
                                                 
25 We also have information from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) on governments that are officially religious, 
although not maintaining a single religion.  Examples in 1970 for countries in our sample are South Africa, Brazil, 
Philippines, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Switzerland, and Australia.  If we enter an additional dummy variable into 
the systems of Table 3 to capture this officially religious category, the estimated coefficients on this new variable are 
close to zero.   21 
that an established state religion will help to maintain monopoly in the religion market and, 
thereby, a low degree of religious pluralism.  Hence, the pluralism variable could be getting 
credit for influences on religiosity that stem ultimately from the presence of an established 
religion.  If we delete the pluralism index from the system for monthly church attendance, the 
estimated coefficient on the state religion dummy becomes 0.31 (s.e. = 0.15), which is smaller 
than before but still significantly positive.  Our analysis also includes the dummy variable for the 
presence of state regulation of religion.  Since this regulatory system often accompanies a state 
religion (see Table 1), the regulatory variable could be getting credit for effects that stem 
ultimately from state religion.  If we delete the regulatory variable, as well as the pluralism 
index, from the system for monthly church attendance, the estimated coefficient on the state 
religion dummy falls further to 0.08 (s.e. = 0.14), which is statistically insignificantly different 
from zero.  The same pattern of results applies for the systems for weekly church attendance and 
for beliefs in heaven and hell.  Thus, our finding of a positive relation between state religion and 
religiosity depends on our holding constant the measures of religious pluralism and state 
regulation of religion. 
In the literature, the Scandinavian countries are often cited as places in which state 
churches co-exist with low rates of church attendance.  That pattern does characterize the data in 
our study.  However, the low rates of attendance in these countries are explained reasonably well 
by the model, despite the positive coefficient on the state-religion dummy.  For example, Table 4 
shows that, in 1990, the actual and fitted values of monthly church attendance are, respectively, 
0.11 and 0.16 for Denmark, 0.11 and 0.10 for Finland, 0.13 and 0.10 for Norway, and 0.10 and 
0.11 for Sweden.  The reason for the good fit for the Scandinavian countries is that the other   22 
variables contained in the system, especially per capita GDP and the composition of religions 
(discussed in the next section), predict low levels of religiosity. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that government regulation of religion tends to depress 
church attendance, religious beliefs, and religiousness.  The estimated coefficients are all 
significantly negative except for the one for belief in an after-life (column 5).  Hence, in contrast 
to our results on state religion, our findings on regulation support the arguments from the 
religion-market model.  Better measurement of the indicator for regulation of the religion market 
may sharpen these results. 
For monthly church attendance, the estimated coefficient of -0.57 (s.e. = 0.12) on the 
state regulation dummy variable in column 2 of Table 3 means that the introduction of a 
government regulatory system for religion would lower monthly church attendance by 12 
percentage points (from the mean of 0.37 to 0.25).  As already noted, state religion and 
government regulation of religion often come as a package—see Table 1.  If a state religion is 
imposed along with regulation, the estimated net effect on monthly church attendance is positive 
but by only about 4 percentage points.  
The presence of a Communist regime has a substantial negative relation with church 
attendance and religious beliefs.  For example, for monthly church attendance, the estimated 
coefficient of -0.72 (s.e. = 0.21) in column 2 of Table 3 implies that the imposition of 
Communism would lower the attendance rate by 15 percentage points (from the mean of 0.37 
to 0.22). 
By comparing the three later surveys—WVS around 1995, ISSP around 1998, and Gallup 
in 1999—with the three earlier ones, we can estimate how the downfall of the Communist 
systems in Eastern Europe affected religiosity.  The results are that church attendance and   23 
religious beliefs tended to recover in the former Communist countries during the 1990s.
26  For 
example, for monthly church attendance in column 2 of Table 3, the estimated net remaining 
effect in 1999 from the presence of Communism before 1990 is given by the coefficient on the 
Communism dummy, -0.72, plus the coefficient for ex-Communism (in 1999), 0.40.  Hence, the 
net remaining effect for 1999 is a coefficient of -0.32.  That coefficient implies a net reduction of 
monthly attendance in 1999 by only 7 percentage points (from the mean of 0.37 to 0.30). 
 
E.  Religious Pluralism and the Composition of Religions   
Table 3 shows that the religious pluralism indicator (shown in Table 1) has significantly 
positive coefficients in the systems for church attendance.  This pattern accords with the religion-
market model’s argument that greater pluralism would encourage competition among religion 
providers and lead, thereby, to better service and higher rates of attendance.  The estimated 
coefficient in column 2 of 1.60 (s.e. = 0.34) means that an increase in pluralism by 0.23 (its 
sample standard deviation) raises monthly church attendance by 9 percentage points (from the 
mean of 0.37 to 0.46).  Religious pluralism also has positive relationships with beliefs in heaven 
and hell and religiousness, but these results are not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
With respect to the composition of religions, recall that each coefficient gives the effect 
relative to that for Catholic (the omitted category).  Recall also that the variables are the fractions 
                                                 
26 Poland is an exception, as it exhibits a small decline in church attendance during the 1990s.  However, Poland is 
even more of an outlier with respect to its high rates of church attendance before the 1990s.  The model explains 
little of the high rate of church attendance in 1990—see Table 4.  Some observers explain the high religiosity during 
the Communist period by observing that the Catholic church occupied a chief position of political opposition to the 
government and was popular and important for these reasons.  The decline in religious participation in the 1990s 
could then reflect the elimination of this political role for the church, once the Communist regime collapsed.  
Although these arguments seem reasonable, they have the shortcoming of explaining the vibrancy of religion in 
Poland up to 1990 by observing that it was vibrant.  The question is, why did religion occupy a different place in 
Poland than, say, in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, which were also historically predominantly Catholic?   24 
of the population adhering to the indicated religion among persons who express adherence to 
some religion. 
Most of the religions are lower than Catholic in their rates of church attendance.
27  The 
main exception is Muslim, which has a significantly positive coefficient for weekly attendance 
and a positive, but statistically insignificant, coefficient for monthly attendance.  For the 
religious beliefs, most of the religions are again lower than Catholic.  However, the Muslim 
coefficient is positive, as is the one for other religions.  Particularly noteworthy is the large 
positive coefficient for the Muslim religion in the system for belief in heaven and, even more so, 
for belief in hell. 
 
F.  Actual and Fitted Values 
The estimates shown in Table 3 do not, of course, explain all of the cross-country 
variations in religiosity.  To get a sense of what is explained and unexplained, Table 4 shows the 
actual and fitted values of monthly church attendance and belief in heaven for countries included 
in the 1990 WVS (37 observations for attendance and 34 for belief).  As an example, the United 
States has often been cited as a country that is surprisingly religious, given its level of per capita 
GDP and other variables.  The table shows that the residuals are indeed positive—the actual 
attendance of 0.58 compares with the fitted value of 0.36, and the actual belief in heaven of 0.87 
contrasts with the fitted value of 0.57.  However, the United States is not unique as a country 
with substantial residuals.  The largest errors are for Poland, which has much higher levels of 
religiosity than those predicted by the model. 
                                                 
27 These results can reflect differences across religions in the role of attending church or analogous houses of 
worship.  For example, religions vary by the weight that they attach to organized services versus personal prayer.   25 
Despite the presence of substantial residuals, the model does explain a good deal of the 
cross-country variation in religiosity.  The R-squared values shown in Table 3 indicate the 
overall fits.  The model’s explanatory power, including that for the United States, improves when 
we add additional explanatory variables to describe more detailed aspects of economic 
development.  However, as we discuss later, that extension also makes causal inferences more 
difficult. 
 
G.  Causality and Instrumental Estimates 
A major issue in the interpretation of the estimates in Table 3 is whether they reflect 
causation from the independent variables to religiosity, rather than the reverse.  We think that the 
main concern arises for per capita GDP—do the coefficients reflect the effect of economic 
development on religiosity or, in reverse, the effect of religiosity on development? 
In our previous study (Barro and McCleary [2003]), we estimated effects of religiosity—
church attendance and religious beliefs—on economic growth.  To isolate causation from 
religiosity to growth, we used instrumental variables suggested by the types of results reported in 
Table 3.
28  Specifically, our instruments were the dummy variables for state religion and state 
regulation of regulation, the composition of adherence across the religions, and the religious 
pluralism index (which was constructed from the adherence shares).  The results indicated that 
growth responded positively to higher religious beliefs, notably beliefs in hell, heaven, and an 
after-life, but negatively to higher church attendance for given beliefs.  Growth was not much 
related to the overall level of religiosity—that is, if beliefs and attendance moved together in 
their usual manner, the net impact on growth was small.  Hence, countries that were more or less 
religious overall tended to grow neither faster nor slower than average. 
                                                 
28 For a discussion of instrumental variables, see Wooldridge (2003, chap. 15).   26 
In Table 3, the dependent variables are levels of religiosity.  The main sample variations 
in these variables—church attendance, beliefs, and religiousness—reflect the overall extent of 
religiosity in a country.  Therefore, our previous results suggest that these religiosity measures 
would not have much influence on economic growth.  Hence, we do not anticipate much reverse 
causation from levels of religiosity to levels of per capita GDP. 
To test this conjecture, we re-estimated systems of the form shown in Table 3 by using 
instrumental variables for the log of per capita GDP.  We constructed the instruments in two 
ways.  The first approach uses an earlier value of the log of per capita GDP—for 1970—as an 
instrument.
29  This procedure isolates the timing from prior levels of economic development to 
subsequent levels of religiosity.  However, this technique may not adequately establish causation 
because many country-specific variables, including unobserved dimensions of economic 
development and religiosity, tend to persist strongly over time.   
Our second approach uses exogenous geographical features of countries as instruments.  
The two variables used are the distance from the equator and a dummy variable for land-locked 
status.  The distance variable (measured as the absolute value of degrees latitude) affects climate 
and, therefore, aspects of agricultural productivity and disease.  Land-locked status influences 
the convenience of transport and, hence, the potential for international trade.  These two 
variables have considerable explanatory power for the log of per capita GDP.  As an example, 
we estimated a SUR system for 151 countries for observations on the log of per capita GDP at 
ten-year intervals from 1960 to 2000.  The system also includes the dummy for Communism and 
has separate intercepts for each time period.  The R-squared values in the five equations are 
around 0.5, and the estimated coefficients are 4.14 (s.e. = 0.27) on the absolute value of degrees 
                                                 
29 For some Eastern European countries, the earliest available data on GDP are for 1995.  The results in Table 4 
include these observations in the instrument for the log of per capita GDP.  However, the conclusions are similar if 
we drop these countries from the sample.   27 
latitude,
30 -0.36 (s.e. = 0.10) on the dummy variable for land-locked status, and -0.67 (s.e. = 
0.11) on the dummy variable for Communism. 
Table 5 shows the estimates of the coefficients of log per capita GDP when the systems 
for religiosity in Table 3 are re-estimated using our instrumental variables.  The coefficients of 
the other explanatory variables are not shown (and the results do not differ much from those in 
Table 3).  The coefficients in Table 5 should be compared with those for the log of per capita 
GDP for each corresponding system in Table 3.  These earlier results did not use instrumental 
variables.  The important finding is that both sets of instrumental estimates in Table 5 are 
broadly similar to those in Table 3.  The main difference is a tendency for the instrumental 
estimates to be higher in magnitude.  That is, when we instrument, we find a somewhat greater 
tendency for increases in per capita GDP to reduce religiosity.
31  In any event, our allowance for 
reverse causation from religiosity to economic development leaves intact the conclusion that 
economic development decreases religiosity. 
Although our main concern with reverse causation is with the link between religiosity 
and per capita GDP, it is possible that endogeneity issues could also arise for other explanatory 
variables in Table 3.  One concern is that greater religiousness might help to explain why a 
country has a state religion.  An opposing argument is that state religions were typically 
implemented many years in the past, for example, more than 400 years ago in Scandinavia.  
Hence, the presence of a state religion reflects mainly the long-term history and is largely 
exogenous with respect to current religiosity.  However, it could be argued that less religious 
                                                 
30 Being too close to the equator is clearly bad for an economy.  However, being too far away is also bad because 
eventually temperatures get too cold.  To capture this last effect, we entered the square of degrees latitude into the 
regressions.  The coefficient of this variable differed insignificantly from zero because our sample does not include 
places, such as Greenland and Antarctica, that are excessively far from the equator.   
31 We would expect this pattern if religiosity had a positive, but not very large, effect on per capita GDP.  In that 
case, the estimates of the GDP coefficients in Table 3 would tend to be biased upward, that is, they would 
underestimate the magnitude of the negative effect of per capita GDP on religiosity.   28 
nations are more likely to abandon their state religions.  To proceed further, we would need a 
political theory of the propensity to implement and maintain state religion.  Although the 
development of this theory would be interesting, the main empirical problem is likely to be the 
isolation of exogenous variables that serve as satisfactory instruments for state religion or state 
regulation of religion. 
Another possibility for reverse causation is that differences in religiosity would influence 
the composition of religious adherence.  This process could involve religious conversion and 
patterns of fertility and immigration that differ across religions.  Again, the principal challenge 
would be to isolate exogenous variables that serve satisfactorily as instruments—in this case, for 
the composition of religious adherence.  We can also note that the religious pluralism index is 
constructed from the data on religious adherence shares.  Hence, the pluralism variable does not 
raise any new concerns about endogeneity—if the adherence shares are properly viewed as 
exogenous with respect to religiosity, then the pluralism index would also be exogenous. 
 
H.  Dimensions of Economic Development 
Our results for per capita GDP indicate that the overall effect of economic development is 
to reduce religiosity.  However, as mentioned before, economic development has various 
dimensions, including increases in education, urbanization, and life expectancy, and reductions 
in fertility.  The patterns in life expectancy and fertility imply that richer countries have an age 
structure that is tilted more toward the old and away from the young.  When we measure 
economic development solely by per capita GDP, we implicitly combine all of these aspects of 
development into a single variable.  However, the theoretical reasoning in our first section   29 
suggests that the different aspects of economic development would relate differently to 
religiosity.   
The present panel data set includes enough observations to distinguish the effects from 
the various dimensions of development.  Therefore, we now extend the analysis from Table 3 to 
include five additional economic-demographic variables:  educational attainment, the 
urbanization rate, life expectancy, and the fractions of the population aged over 65 and under 15.  
The education data are from Barro and Lee (2001) and the other data are from World 
Bank (2002).  Life expectancy at age one is entered as a reciprocal and, therefore, measures the 
average mortality rate per year. 
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients for the new economic-demographic variables, 
along with the coefficients for the log of per capita GDP.  (The other explanatory variables in 
Table 3 are included, but their coefficients are not shown.)  These estimates do not use 
instrumental variables, because we lack instruments that can distinguish satisfactorily among the 
various dimensions of economic development.  Hence, we have to be cautious about causal 
inferences—the coefficients in Table 6 represent partial correlations with the religiosity 
measures. 
The results in Table 6 reveal very different patterns for the individual dimensions of 
economic development.  One result is a significantly positive coefficient for education in all of 
the religiosity systems.  For example, the estimated coefficient of 0.192 (s.e. = 0.036) in 
column 2 implies, if interpreted causally, that an increase in average schooling by 2.1 years (the 
sample standard deviation in Table 2) would raise monthly church attendance by 10 percentage 
points (from the mean of 0.37 to 0.47).  The positive partial association between education and 
church attendance accords with Sacerdote and Glaeser’s (2001) analysis, which focused on the   30 
incentives of educated people to attend group activities, including church services.  However, in 
contrast with their findings, the results in Table 6 also reveal positive partial associations 
between education and religious beliefs.  One clear inference is that the overall negative effect of 
economic development on religiosity (found in Tables 3 and 5) does not work through education.  
That is, we cannot conclude that richer societies are less religious because people are better 
educated. 
Another clear pattern in Table 6 is the significantly negative partial relation between the 
measures of religiosity and the urbanization rate.  For example, the estimated coefficient of -1.49 
(s.e. = 0.34) for monthly church attendance in column 2 means, if viewed causally, that an 
increase in the urbanization rate by 0.16 (its sample standard deviation) would lower monthly 
attendance by 5 percentage points.  Thus, as predicted from theoretical arguments, one reason 
that richer societies are less religious is probably that the population is more urban. 
Table 6 shows that a greater presence of children (higher population share under age 15) 
goes along with higher religiosity.  For example, for monthly church attendance in column 2, the 
coefficient of 5.5 (s.e. = 2.0) means, if viewed causally, that a decrease in the under-15 
population share by 0.077 (its sample standard deviation) would lower attendance by 9 
percentage points (from the mean of 0.37 to 0.28).  Hence, as expected from theoretical 
reasoning, the lesser presence of children in rich societies likely accounts for part of the lower 
religiosity. 
The results for life expectancy and the over-65 age share are more difficult to interpret.  
For monthly church attendance, in column 2 of Table 6, the coefficients for mortality (the 
reciprocal of life expectancy) and the over-65 age share are individually and jointly 
insignificantly different from zero.  The p-value for joint significance of the two coefficients is   31 
0.18.  Thus, we do not find any clear relation of church attendance to life expectancy and the old-
age share of the population. 
For religious beliefs, the coefficients on mortality and the over-65 age share tend to be 
negative.  For example, for belief in heaven in column 3 of Table 6, the coefficient of -3.5 
(s.e. = 2.0) means that a decrease in mortality by 0.11 (its sample standard deviation) would raise 
belief by 9 percentage points (from the mean of 0.56 to 0.65).  The coefficient of -9.8 (s.e. = 4.8) 
implies that an increase in the over-65 age share by 0.042 (its sample standard deviation) would 
reduce belief by 10 percentage points (from 0.56 to 0.46).  These two coefficients are jointly 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.011).  However, in thinking about the typical pattern of 
economic development, we would combine the effect from a decrease in mortality (say by one 
standard deviation) with an increase in the over-65 age share (again by one standard deviation).  
Therefore, the results suggest that falling mortality and rising old-age share offset each other and 
have little overall relation with religious belief.  In this sense, the conclusion for religious beliefs 
is similar to that for church attendance. 
The estimates in Table 6 indicate that, once the other economic and demographic 
variables are held constant, the relations between the religiosity measures and per capita GDP are 
statistically insignificantly different from zero.  Thus, it is likely that the effects of economic 
development on religiosity do not involve higher income, per se.  Rather, the main effects work 
through changes in education, urbanization, the presence of children, and so on. 
The addition of the five explanatory variables in Table 6 does significantly improve the 
fits of the relationships—the R-squared values shown can be compared with the corresponding 
values in Table 3.  As an example, for the United States in the 1990 WVS, monthly church 
attendance is 0.58 and the fitted value from Table 6, column 2, is 0.49, compared to the fitted   32 
value from Table 3, column 2 of 0.36.  Similarly, for belief in heaven, the actual value is 0.87 
and the fitted value from Table 6, column 2, is 0.77, compared to the fitted value from Table 3, 
column 2 of 0.57.  Thus, when the detailed dimensions of economic development are considered, 
the United States is no longer so much of an outlier with respect to its religiosity.  
 
I.  Superstition   
As discussed before, one dimension of the secularization hypothesis—which the data 
failed to confirm—is that increased education would generate lower levels of church attendance 
and religious beliefs.  The theoretical rationale for this linkage was that religion amounted to 
superstition and ignorance and, hence, that religious activities would decline as people became 
better educated.   
Another way to assess this hypothesis is to look at other beliefs that seem clearly to 
reflect superstition and ignorance.  The ISSP surveys offer three good candidates:  belief in 
fortune tellers (“some fortune tellers really can foresee the future”), belief in horoscopes (“a 
person’s star sign at birth, or horoscope, can affect the course of their future”), and belief in 
good-luck charms (“good luck charms sometimes do bring good luck”).  The predictive content 
from these forecasting “tools” should be scientifically testable.  Although we have not done the 
analysis, we take it as plausible that none actually has predictive content. 
Data on the three superstition variables are available from the ISSP only for 17 Christian 
countries, which are listed in Table 7.  The table shows the fraction of persons holding each of 
the beliefs.  We were surprised by the high levels—they range from 19% of the Irish population 
believing in horoscopes to 80% of the Latvian population believing in fortune tellers.  Table 8 
shows that there is a strong positive correlation among the three superstitious beliefs.  Therefore,   33 
we focus on the simple average of the three, as shown in the first column of Table 7.  These 
values range from 25% in Ireland to 73% in Latvia. 
Table 9 shows, for the 17 countries included in Table 7, the correlations among the 
religiosity variables considered before.  These correlations are strongly positive whether we look 
at church attendance, religious beliefs, or religiousness.  However, the most interesting finding, 
shown in the first column of Table 9, is that the correlation between the average superstition 
indicator and each of the religiosity variables is negative.  These values range from -0.37 for 
belief in hell to -0.63 for belief in heaven. 
One conclusion is that religious beliefs and superstitious beliefs are very different.  A 
possible reason is that religious beliefs are compatible with increased education and knowledge, 
whereas the superstitious beliefs are not.
32  However, another possibility is that the superstitions 
tend to substitute for religious beliefs and activities in societies where the standard religious 
practices are suppressed or are unavailable for other reasons.  Notably, folk religions anchored in 
superstition and lacking in the infrastructure of organized religion are likely responses to 
religious suppression by the central authority.  These ideas accord with the observation that the 
superstition variables, shown in Table 7, are the highest in the formerly Communist countries of 
Eastern Europe.   
Another point is that organized religions, notably the Catholic Church, try to suppress 
superstitions, including the labeling of some of these practices as sins.  Possibly, as in the 
attempts of Communist governments to eradicate “respectable” religions, the idea is to suppress 
                                                 
32 We do not have sufficient data on the superstition variables to carry out the sort of cross-country statistical 
analysis done in Tables 3 and 6.   34 
competition.
33  The success of this anti-superstition campaign may explain why the superstition 
variables are particularly low in the most devout Catholic countries included in Table 7, Ireland 
and the Philippines.  This pattern also shows up in a comparison of mostly Protestant Great 
Britain with mostly Catholic Northern Ireland.  The average of the three superstition indicators 
for Great Britain is 0.32, whereas that for Northern Ireland is 0.25. 
 
IV.  Concluding Observations 
  Our empirical work used a cross-country panel that includes country level information on 
religiosity—church attendance, religious beliefs, and religiousness (measured by whether people 
consider themselves to be religious).  These data derive from individual information collected in 
six international surveys between 1981 and 1999.   
We found that the various measures of religiosity tended to decline as an indicator of 
economic development—per capita GDP—increased.  Moreover, results from instrumental 
estimation suggest that this linkage represents causation from economic development to 
religiosity, rather than the reverse.   
  We found that the presence of a state religion tended to raise church attendance, 
religiousness, and some measures of religious belief.  We think that these effects arise because of 
the subsidies that typically flow to the established religions.  However, religiosity tended to 
decline in response to government regulation of the religion market and with the presence of a 
Communist government.  The elimination of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe led to a 
recovery of religiosity in most of these countries during the 1990s. 
                                                 
33 The Catholic Church may also have competed by incorporating magical practices into its own ceremonies, notably 
the Eucharist in which a wafer and wine are ontologically identified as the body and blood of Christ.  Luther and 
subsequent forms of Protestantism denounced these practices as untenable.   35 
  Greater religious pluralism, measured by the diversity of adherence among the major 
religions, tended to raise church attendance.  However, pluralism was not significantly related to 
religious beliefs or religiousness.  Across the religions, attendance and beliefs tended to be 
highest for Muslim, then Catholic, then the other faiths:  eastern religions (including Buddhist), 
Hindu, Jewish, Orthodox, and Protestant. 
  We also examined the relation of religiosity to detailed dimensions of development: 
education, urbanization, life expectancy, and the shares of the population that were over 65 and 
under 15.  We found that the measures of religiosity were positively related to education, 
negatively related to urbanization, and, in most cases, positively related to the under-15 age 
share.  Religiosity had little overall relation with life expectancy and the over-65 age share.  
Moreover, once we held fixed these specific aspects of economic development, we found that 
religiosity was virtually unrelated to per capita GDP. 
  Future research could usefully extend our findings in a number of directions.  One 
extension would be to use Fox and Sandler’s (2003) data—once they become available—to sort 
out the effects on organized religion from various governmental regulations, subsidies, and 
prohibitions.  Other work would seek to explain the implementation and demise of state 
religions, with particular emphasis on the changes in the former Communist countries in Europe 
and Asia.  It would also be valuable to assess the relationships between religiosity and political 
and social indicators, including measures of electoral rights and civil liberties. 
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Table 1  State Religion, State Regulation of Religion, 
and Religious Pluralism Index for Countries in the Sample 
               












Argentina  1  1  0.13  Latvia  0  1  0.68 
Australia  0  0  0.51  Lithuania  0  1  0.13 
Austria  0  0  0.15  Luxembourg  1  1  0.04 
Bangladesh  1  1  0.24  Malaysia  1  0  0.68 
Belgium  0  0  0.05  Mexico  0  0  0.05 
Brazil  0  0  0.20  Netherlands  0  0  0.53 
Bulgaria  0  0  0.28  New Zealand  0  0  0.37 
Cameroon  0  0  0.73  Nigeria  0  1  0.69 
Canada  0  0  0.56  Norway  1  1  0.01 
Chile  0  0  0.22  Pakistan  1  0  0.06 
China  0  1  0.46  Peru  1  1  0.09 
Colombia  1  0  0.05  Philippines  0  0  0.28 
Cyprus  0  0  0.36  Poland  0  0  0.19 
Czech Rep.  0  1  0.43  Portugal  1  0  0.02 
Denmark  1  0  0.02  Romania  0  0  0.40 
Dominic. Rep.  1  0  0.05  Russia  0  1  0.51 
Estonia  0  1  0.48  Singapore  0  0  0.63 
Finland  1  1  0.03  Slovak Rep.  0  1  0.34 
France  0  1  0.17  Slovenia  0  0  0.12 
Germany (W.)  0  0  0.54  Spain  1  0  0.00 
Ghana  0  0  0.72  Sweden  1  1  0.08 
Greece  1  1  0.04  Switzerland  0  0  0.51 
Hong Kong  0  0  0.60  South Africa  0  0  0.63 
Hungary  0  1  0.47  Taiwan  0  0  0.58 
Iceland  1  0  0.03  Thailand  1  1  0.14 
India  0  0  0.31  Turkey  0  1  0.01 
Ireland  1  0  0.08  U.K.  1  1  0.33 
Israel  1  0  0.19  Uruguay  0  0  0.14 
Italy  1  1  0.01  U.S.  0  0  0.64 
Japan  0  0  0.46  Venezuela  1  1  0.08 
Korea (S.)  0  0  0.33         
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Notes to Table 1 
The presence of a state religion (value 1 for the dummy variable) refers to the situation 
around 1970, as designated by Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001, pp. 834-35).  We assigned the 
value one only if Barrett, et al, designated an individual religion, not if they classified the state as 
favoring religion in general.  State regulation (value 1) refers to a situation in which the state 
appoints or approves church leaders.  This designation comes from discussions in Barrett (1982) 
and Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) and elsewhere and typically applies during the late 
1970s.  The pluralism index is one minus the Herfindahl index based on the fractions of 
adherents in 1980 to nine major religions, among persons expressing adherence to some religion.  
The religions are Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Hindu, Buddhist, other eastern religions, Jewish, 
Orthodox, and other. These data are from Barrett (1982).  For the Eastern European countries 
shown at the end of the table, the data are from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001) and apply in 
1990.  The countries shown are the ones included in the subsequent statistical analysis (as 
dictated by data availability).   42 
 
Table 2  Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
     
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation 
     
Weekly church attendance  0.25  0.22 
Monthly church attendance  0.37  0.24 
Belief in heaven  0.56  0.22 
Belief in hell  0.38  0.21 
Belief in after-life  0.58  0.17 
Belief in God in some form  0.80  0.14 
Religious person  0.61  0.20 
      log[x/(1-x)] for:     
      weekly attendance  -1.46  1.41 
      monthly attendance  -0.70  1.24 
      belief in heaven  0.37  1.21 
      belief in hell  -0.54  1.07 
      belief in after-life  0.37  0.77 
      belief in God  1.77  1.26 
      religious person  0.54  1.00 
Log of per capita GDP  9.33  0.77 
Years of education (years)  8.29  2.10 
Urbanization rate  0.70  0.16 
Life expectancy at age 1 (years)  73.8  4.8 
1/(life expect. at age 1) (x 100)  1.36  0.11 
Population share > 65  0.111  0.042 
Population share < 15  0.240  0.077 
Religious pluralism  0.30  0.23 
State religion  0.32  0.47 
Regulation of religion  0.38  0.49 
Communist regime  0.23  0.42 
Catholic fraction  0.47  0.40 
Eastern religion fraction  0.075  0.242 
Hindu fraction  0.011  0.085 
Jewish fraction  0.010  0.073 
Muslim fraction  0.048  0.154 
Orthodox fraction  0.075  0.208 
Protestant fraction  0.29  0.33 
Other religion fraction  0.022  0.064 
Non-religious fraction  0.105  0.123 
Average “superstition”  0.43  0.14 
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Notes to Table 2 
  The columns show the (unweighted) means and standard deviations of the variables used 
in Table 3, along with some other variables.  The sample for most variables is the set of 
observations for which data are available for church attendance or belief in heaven and for the 
explanatory variables used in Table 3.  For the religious belief variables, the set of observations 
is smaller.  The religion fractions, aside from non-religious, are relative to the population of 
adherents to some religion.  The non-religion fraction is relative to the total population.  For 
superstition, the values refer to the average of the three indicators shown in Table 7 (available for 
17 countries).  44 
 
 
Table 3  Determinants of Church Attendance and Religious Beliefs 
(cells show estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses) 
       
  (1)  (2)  (3) 






belief in  
heaven 
       
Log of per capita GDP  -0.47 (0.10)***  -0.52 (0.10)***  -0.80 (0.13)*** 
Religious pluralism    2.16 (0.39)***   1.60 (0.34)***   0.78 (0.48) 
State religion   0.79 (0.18)***   0.75 (0.16)***   0.59 (0.24)* 
Regulation of religion  -0.56 (0.14)***  -0.57 (0.12)***  -0.49 (0.18)** 
Communist regime  -0.63 (0.22)**  -0.72 (0.21)***  -1.10 (0.25)*** 
Ex-Communist (in 1995)   0.09 (0.22)   0.13 (0.22)   0.26 (0.32) 
Ex-Communist (in 1998)   0.13 (0.20)   0.31 (0.17)   0.20 (0.20) 
Ex-Communist (in 1999)   0.27 (0.25)   0.40 (0.23)  -- 
ISSP data  -0.17 (0.10)  -0.13 (0.09)   0.19 (0.10)* 
Gallup data  -0.03 (0.12)  -0.11 (0.10)  -- 
Eastern religion fraction  -2.80 (0.28)***  -2.32 (0.26)***  -0.96 (0.42)* 
Hindu fraction  -0.73 (0.56)  -0.84 (0.55)  -3.08 (0.57)*** 
Jewish fraction  -1.92 (0.53)***  -2.27 (0.46)***  -1.30 (0.45)** 
Muslim fraction   1.10 (0.34)**   0.45 (0.32)   1.48 (0.44)** 
Orthodox fraction  -2.57 (0.30)***  -1.64 (0.27)***  -1.02 (0.36)** 
Protestant fraction  -2.28 (0.22)***  -1.90 (0.20)***  -0.71 (0.26)** 
Other religion fraction   1.26 (0.94)   1.33 (0.90)    3.19 (1.16)** 
       
Number of countries and 
   total observations 
61, 188  61, 185  51, 132 
Number of observations for  
   each equation 
24, 38, 22,   
33, 28, 43 
22, 37, 22,    
33, 28, 43 
21, 34, 16,    
31, 30 
R-squared for each  
   equation 
.78, .70, .71, 
.86, .67, .75 
.77, .63, .71, 
.80, .75, .76 
.36, .66, .68, 
.76, .64 
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Table 3, continued 
         
  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 








         
Log of per capita GDP  -0.51 (0.13)***  -0.34 (0.10)**  -0.69 (0.12)***  -0.20 (0.13) 
Religious pluralism   0.93 (0.47)  -0.16 (0.38)  -0.14 (0.43)   0.73 (0.43) 
State religion   0.57 (0.23)*  0.05 (0.19)   0.25 (0.21)   0.45 (0.21)* 
Regulation of religion  -0.42 (0.17)*  -0.22 (0.14)  -0.32 (0.15)*  -0.57 (0.16)*** 
Communist regime  -0.71 (0.24)**  -1.03 (0.21)***  -1.41 (0.25)***  -0.51 (0.24)* 
Ex-Communist (in 1995)   0.72 (0.30)*   0.27 (0.26)   0.06 (0.35)   0.54 (0.24)* 
Ex-Communist (in 1998)   0.37 (0.21)   0.38 (0.17)*   0.42 (0.21)*   0.31 (0.24) 
Ex-Communist (in 1999)  --  --   0.85 (0.30)**  -- 
ISSP data   0.46 (0.10)***   0.23 (0.08)**   0.07 (0.11)  -0.64 (0.12)*** 
Gallup data  --  --  -0.56 (0.14)***  -- 
Eastern religion fraction  -0.26 (0.39)  -0.34 (0.29)  -1.59 (0.32)***  -2.21 (0.32)*** 
Hindu fraction  -1.23 (0.65)  -1.84 (0.49)***  -1.35 (0.68)  -0.40 (0.64) 
Jewish fraction  -0.71 (0.44)  -0.81 (0.37)*  -1.17 (0.43)**  -1.94 (0.51)*** 
Muslim fraction   2.41 (0.47)***   0.41 (0.37)   0.50 (0.54)   0.57 (0.45) 
Orthodox fraction  -0.61 (0.36)  -0.35 (0.29)  -0.40 (0.30)  -0.61 (0.38) 
Protestant fraction  -1.24 (0.26)***  -0.28 (0.21)  -1.17 (0.24)***  -1.10 (0.23)*** 
Other religion fraction   1.86 (1.17)   2.13 (0.96)*   4.00 (1.14)***   2.55 (1.07)* 
         
Number of countries and 
   total observations 
51, 132  53, 137  59, 174  51, 135 
Number of observations 
   for each equation 
21, 34, 16,  
  31, 30 
26, 34, 16, 
31, 30 
23, 32, 16, 
31, 30, 42 
21, 37, 15, 
32, 30 
R-squared for each 
   equation 
.48, .44, .56,  
66, .56 
.42, .49, .61, 
.55, .47 
.52, .54, .73, 
.75, .70, .55 




*p-value < .05, **p-value < .01, ***p-value < .001. 
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Notes to Table 3 
 
  Each system has five or six equations, corresponding to observations on the dependent 
variables at five or six points in time: 1981-84, subsequently called 1981 (World Values Survey 
data mostly for 1981, supplemented by information from Gallup surveys for a few countries); 
1990-93, subsequently called 1990 (WVS data mostly for 1990, plus observations on some 
variables for Greece in 1987 from Eurodim); 1990-93, subsequently called 1991 (International 
Social Survey Programme data mostly for 1991); 1995-97, subsequently called 1995 (WVS data 
mostly for 1995 or 1996); 1998-2000, subsequently called 1998 (ISSP data mostly for 1998); and 
1999 (Gallup Millennium Survey).  The last source has data only for church attendance and belief 
in God.  The dependent variables are population averages for countries of (1) weekly church 
attendance, (2) monthly church attendance, (3) belief in heaven, (4) belief in hell, (5) belief in an 
after-life, (6) belief in god, and (7) persons who consider themselves religious.  The measured 
value is the fraction of people attending, the fraction who hold the belief, or the fraction who 
consider themselves religious.  For example, in system 1, weekly church attendance is observed 
for 24 countries with 1981 data, 38 countries with 1990 data, 22 countries with 1991 data, 33 
countries with 1995 data, 28 countries with 1998 data, and 43 countries with 1999 data.  The 
form of each dependent variable is log[x/(1-x)], where x is the fraction of persons attending or 
believing or considering themselves religious. 
 
The log of real per capita GDP, from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002), is for 1980 in 
the 1981 equation, 1990 in the equations for 1990 and 1991, and 1995 in the equations for 1995, 
1998, and 1999.  Because of missing data for 1990, GDP data for 1995 are used for Bulgaria and 
Russia in the equations for 1990 and 1991.  Because of missing data for 1995, GDP data for 
1990 are used for West Germany in the systems for 1995 and 1998.  The measures of religious 
pluralism, state religion, state regulation of religion, and religious adherence are discussed in the 
text.  The dummy for the presence of a Communist regime applies to the pre-1990 period.  The 
1995 and later equations also include a dummy for whether the country had been Communist but 
is no longer Communist.  For example, in the 1995 equations, the total effect for a former 
Communist country equals the coefficient on the Communist dummy plus the coefficient on the 
ex-Communist (in 1995) dummy.  The dummy for the use of ISSP data applies to the 1991 and 
1998 equations and that for Gallup applies to the 1999 equation.   
 
Each system is estimated by the seemingly-unrelated (SUR) method, which allows the 
error terms to be correlated over the time periods for each country.  This procedure does not 
weight countries differentially for size or other characteristics.  Constant terms, not shown, are 
included for each system.  The constants vary by system but not across the equations within a 
system. 
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Table 4  Actual and Fitted Values of Monthly Church Attendance 
and Belief in Heaven for 1990 WVS Sample 
         
Country  Monthly church 
attendance 
Fitted attendance  Belief in 
heaven 
Fitted belief 
Argentina  0.55  0.57  0.69  0.75 
Austria  0.44  0.39  0.47  0.54 
Belgium  0.35  0.38  0.34  0.54 
Bulgaria  0.09  0.17  0.16  0.36 
Brazil  0.50  0.59  0.76  0.79 
Canada  0.40  0.35  0.71  0.53 
Chile  0.46  0.62  0.77  0.82 
China  0.01  0.13  --  -- 
Czech Rep.  0.11  0.18  --  -- 
Denmark  0.11  0.16  0.19  0.48 
Finland  0.11  0.10  0.55  0.38 
France  0.17  0.28  0.32  0.43 
Germany  0.33  0.34  0.37  0.53 
Greece  0.29  0.16  --  -- 
Hungary  0.34  0.20  0.27  0.31 
Iceland  0.09  0.16  0.57  0.50 
India  0.34  0.20  0.43  0.50 
Ireland  0.88  0.61  0.90  0.73 
Italy  0.51  0.42  0.52  0.56 
Japan  0.14  0.11  0.43  0.37 
Latvia  0.09  0.16  0.12  0.26 
Mexico  0.63  0.51  0.70  0.72 
Netherlands  0.13  0.09  0.37  0.54 
Nigeria  0.88  0.80  0.96  0.97 
Norway  0.13  0.09  0.44  0.37 
Poland  0.85  0.36  0.80  0.49 
Portugal  0.48  0.62  0.62  0.75 
Romania  0.31  0.21  0.58  0.41 
Russia  0.06  0.13  0.18  0.29 
Slovak Rep.  0.40  0.19  --  -- 
Slovenia  0.35  0.28  0.30  0.35 
South Africa  --  --  0.90  0.90 
Spain  0.40  0.59  0.52  0.72 
Sweden  0.10  0.11  0.31  0.38 
Switzerland  0.43  0.33  0.45  0.49 
Turkey  0.38  0.50  0.87  0.89 
U.K.  0.26  0.20  0.62  0.48 
U.S.  0.58  0.36  0.87  0.57 
 
Notes:  The data are from the 1990 World Values Survey (WVS) and cover only countries included in that 
survey.  (Greece, covered by 1987 Eurodim, is also included.)  The fitted values for monthly church 
attendance and belief in heaven come from the systems in columns 2 and 3, respectively, of Table 3.   48 
 
Table 5  Instrumental Estimates of GDP Coefficients in Systems for Religiosity 
(cells show estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses) 
       
  (1)  (2)  (3) 




belief in  
heaven 
       
log of per capita GDP in  
     1970 
    -0.50*** 
(0.11) 
    -0.53*** 
(0.10) 
    -0.93*** 
(0.14) 
latitude and land-locked 
     status  
     -0.57*** 
(0.12) 
    -0.63*** 
(0.11) 




  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 








         
log of per capita GDP in  
     1970 
    -0.71*** 
(0.14) 
    -0.53*** 
(0.10) 




latitude and land-locked 
     status  
     -0.59*** 
(0.15) 
    -0.63*** 
(0.11) 












Note:  The systems from Table 3 were reestimated by three-stage least squares.  The instruments 
are the explanatory variables included in Table 3 except for the log of per capita GDP.  This 
variable was replaced in the instrument list in the first case by the log of per capita GDP in 1970 
(1995 for Eastern European countries for which earlier data were unavailable).  In the second 
case, the instrument lists include a country’s absolute value of degrees latitude and a dummy 
variable for whether the country is land-locked.  The cells show the estimated coefficients and 
standard errors for the log of per capita GDP.  The other explanatory variables in Table 3 are 
included in the regressions, but their coefficients are not shown.   49 
 
Table 6  Determinants of Church Attendance and Religious Beliefs: 
Effects of Additional Economic and Demographic Variables 
(cells show estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses) 
       
  (1)  (2)  (3) 






Log of per capita GDP  -0.02 (0.17)  0.04 (0.16)  -0.28 (0.21) 
Years of education  0.209 (.040)***  0.192 (.036)***  0.253 (.040)*** 
Urbanization rate  -1.67 (0.39)***  -1.49 (0.34)***  -1.65 (0.43)*** 
1/(life expectancy at age one)  2.1 (1.3)  2.2 (1.2)  -3.5 (2.0) 
Population share > 65  1.0 (3.6)  0.3 (3.2)  -9.8 (4.8)* 
Population share < 15  4.6 (2.3)*  5.5 (2.0)**  4.9 (2.9) 
Number of countries and 
   total observations 
59, 183  59, 181  50, 130 
Number of observations for  
   each equation 
23, 37, 22,   
32, 28, 41 
22, 36, 22,    
32, 28, 41 
21, 33, 16,    
30, 30 
R-squared for each 
   equation 
.87, .80, .77,  
.91, .77, .72 
.87, .77, .80,  
.89, .84, .74 
.69, .79, .90,      
.85, .84 
 
  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 








         
Log of per capita GDP  -0.28 (0.18)  -0.14 (0.18)  -0.28 (0.21)  0.17 (0.21) 
Years of education  0.234 (.038)***  0.115 (.036)**  0.130 (.045)**  0.118 (0.047)* 
Urbanization rate  -2.11 (0.41)***  -1.42 (0.36)***  -0.90 (0.41)*  -0.99 (0.51) 
1/(life expectancy at age one)  -2.5 (1.7)  -5.5 (1.8)**  -2.8 (1.5)  2.4 (2.1) 
Population share > 65  -12.5 (4.2)**  -6.2 (4.2)  -7.6 (3.9)  -7.5 (5.0) 
Population share < 15  1.5 (2.6)  4.2 (2.6)  5.6 (2.6)*  -1.2 (3.1) 
Number of countries and 
   total observations 
50, 130  52, 135  57, 170  50, 133 
Number of observations for  
   each equation 
21, 33, 16,  
  30, 30 
26, 33, 16, 
30, 30 
22, 32, 16, 
30, 30, 40 
21, 36, 15, 
31, 30 
R-squared for each 
   equation 
.77, .75, .71,  
86, .71 
.63, .65, .74, 
.65, .74 
.73, .66, .82, 
.80, .78, .72 
.52, .68, .59, 
.79, .54 
 
*p-value < .05, **p-value < .01, ***p-value < .001. 
 
Note:  Five explanatory variables (for education, urbanization, life expectancy, and population 
age shares) were added to the systems shown in Table 3.  The cells show the coefficients for 
these variables and for the log of per capita GDP.  Estimation is by the SUR technique.  The 
other explanatory variables in Table 3 are included, but their coefficients are not shown.   50 
 
 
Table 7  Superstition Variables 
         




Horoscopes  Good-luck 
charms 
         
Canada  0.29  0.36  0.23  0.28 
Philippines  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.32 
Austria  0.32  0.26  0.38  0.33 
France  0.35  0.39  0.41  0.24 
West Germany  0.36  0.32  0.38  0.38 
Hungary  0.39  0.44  0.40  0.34 
Ireland  0.25  0.30  0.19  0.25 
Portugal  0.34  0.28  0.30  0.45 
Switzerland  0.42  0.40  0.47  0.40 
United Kingdom  0.32  0.42  0.30  0.24 
New Zealand  0.38  0.46  0.35  0.33 
Bulgaria  0.67  0.65  0.65  0.72 
Czech Republic  0.58  0.71  0.53  0.50 
Latvia  0.73  0.80  0.66  -- 
Russia  0.60  0.68  0.56  0.57 
Slovak Republic  0.55  0.68  0.49  0.48 






Note:  The data on belief in fortune tellers, horoscopes, and good-luck charms come from 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1991 and 1998.  The values shown refer to the 
fraction of the respondents believing in each category.  The numbers are averages of the 1991 
and 1998 waves if both are available.  Otherwise, the value refers to the available wave.  For 
Latvia, belief in good-luck charms is unavailable, and the average of beliefs refers to the other 
two variables.  51 
 
Table 8  Correlations among Superstition Variables 
         








1.0  0.90  0.94  0.90 
Fortune 
tellers 
0.90  1.0  0.78  0.66 
Horoscopes 
 
0.94  0.78  1.0  0.82 
Good-luck 
charms 
0.90  0.66  0.82  1.0 
 
Note:  The table shows the correlations of the indicated column and row variables.  The 
underlying data are in Table 7. 
 
 
Table 9  Correlations for Religiosity Variables (ISSP data) 
                 






















1.0  -0.57  -0.55  -0.63  -0.37  -0.47  -0.56  -0.45 
Weekly 
attendance 
-0.57  1.0  0.98  0.89  0.81  0.78  0.75  0.82 
Monthly 
attendance 
-0.55  0.98  1.0  0.91  0.87  0.86  0.79  0.87 
Belief in 
heaven 
-0.63  0.89  0.91  1.0  0.91  0.87  0.92  0.82 
Belief in 
hell 
-0.37  0.81  0.87  0.91  1.0  0.82  0.79  0.84 
Belief in 
God 
-0.47  0.78  0.86  0.87  0.82  1.0  0.81  0.91 
Belief in 
after-life 
-0.56  0.75  0.79  0.92  0.79  0.81  1.0  0.67 
Religious 
person 
-0.45  0.82  0.87  0.82  0.84  0.91  0.67  1.0 
 
Note:  The table shows the correlations of the indicated column and row variables.  The data for 
the average of the three superstition variables are in Table 7.  The religiosity variables, also from 
the ISSP waves, are for the same set of countries. 
 